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- Abstract 
This chapter examines how ASEAN as a regional organization 
has responded to recent South China Sea disputes and maritime incidents 
amidst the emerging geostrategic competition between the U.S. and 
mainland China. It first traces the key drivers contributing to the 
heightened tensions, including the claimant states' legal maneuvers 
(domestic laws and UN Convention on the Law of Seas), the U.S. 
"Pivot" (or Rebalancing) Policy, and the claimants' increasing unilateral 
measures to create "facts on the ground." It then reviews ASEAN's 
successes and failures in forging institutional responses to mainland 
China's increasingly assertive moves by discussing its various 
mechanisms, such as ARF, ADMM Plus, Declaration of Conduct, and 
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endeavors to sign a binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 
Although ASEAN as a collective body cannot itself be a party in 
territorial disputes and its various members may have variegated 
interests in the South China Sea conditioned by their individual 
relationships with mainland China, they all share common interest in 
maintaining regional peace and stability, as well as the solidarity and 
centrality of ASEAN on key regional issues. Thus, ASEAN's attempts 
to engage mainland China on the South China Sea via the development 
of COC are intertwined with ASEAN's own cohesion. 
Keywords: ASEAN, South China Sea, Mainland China, DOC, COC 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, tensions in the South China Sea have expanded 
beyond territorial disputes among claimants to include potential military 
conflicts and maritime security alerts to all of the stakeholders that 
use the waters. Issues of concern include military competition over 
the control of sea lanes, jurisdictional disputes over undefined or 
overlapping maritime boundaries, and threats to maritime safety and 
freedom of navigation. The situation has been exacerbated in recent 
years by multiple actors. A rising China has begun to behave more 
assertively and forcefully to claim and safeguard its perceived sovereign 
rights and territorial integrity in the region by declaring the South 
China Sea to be part of its "core interests," which are non-negotiable 
and that mainland China would use force to defend. The United States 
has begun to "push back" against mainland China's assertiveness (for 
example, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointedly declared 
in the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi that 
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the U.S. also had national interests in the South China Sea, becoming 
the first U.S. official to do so in regional multilateral forums). 
Meanwhile, other claimants have also intensified their own tactics to 
shore up their respective claims or exercise their rights. In addition 
to legal contention over border delimitation, geostrategic competition 
between the U.S. and mainland China and an increasing number of 
incidents at sea, two new driving forces are added in the South China 
Sea tensions mix. 
For decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
as a regional security organization, has tried to play a role in promoting 
peace and stability in the South China Sea. In 1992, ASEAN member 
states passed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea1 as a 
response (call for exercise of restraint) to mainland China's passage 
of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the 
People's Republic of China. In 2002, ASEAN member states and 
mainland China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea (DOC) to explore cooperation as a means of 
preventing conflict.2 Nevertheless, the non-binding nature of these two 
declarations and ASEAN's commitment to institutional informality 
1. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "ASEAN Declaration on the South 
China Sea," July 22, 1992, adopted by the Foreign Ministers at the 25th 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila, Philippines. 
2. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Declaration on Conduct of 
Parties in the South China Sea," November 4, 2002, adopted by the 
Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and the People's Republic of China at the 
81h ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, <http://www.asean.org/ 
asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-
the-south-china-sea>. 
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have weakened both ASEAN's capacity to consolidate common positions 
among member states and ASEAN's credibility in dealing with mainland 
China collectively. The declared goal of ASEAN unity in the ASEAN 
Charter, which was adopted in November 2007 and went into effect 
in December 2008, gave the semblance that ASEAN might be able to 
act as a collective actor amidst the new dynamics of tension and 
opened a window for improving the situation. The objective of this 
paper is to review how ASEAN, as a regional organization, has 
responded to the recent South China Sea complexities driven by the 
geostrategic competition between the U.S. and mainland China and 
increased maritime incidents. 
II. Dynamics of Tensions 
In March 2009, several developments combined to elevate tensions 
in the South China Sea. First, President Gloria Arroyo of the Philippines 
signed Republic Act No. 9522 (the Archipelagic Baselines Act), which 
incorporated the disputed Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal into 
the territorial sea of the Philippines. Second, mainland China justified 
the dispatch of Yucheng 31 l, a paramilitary fishery patrol ship, to 
safeguard its sovereignty and marine rights in the South China Sea. 
Third, the Impeccable incident near Hainan reinforced friction between 
the U.S. and mainland China over jurisdictional principles and policies 
over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
In May 2009, further fueling the tension were mainland China's 
responses to the Malaysia-Vietnam joint submission and Vietnam's 
individual submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS). In notifications to the Secretary-General of the UN to 
protest Malaysia's and Vietnam's submissions, mainland China attached 
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a nine-dashed line map, 3 covering almost 80% of the South China 
Sea4 and overlapping the exclusive economic zones of coastal countries. 
The map not only caused neighboring states great concern but also 
revealed mainland China's territorial claims. Since then, mainland 
China has been under international pressure to clarify its nine-dashed 
line map. Although the United States does not take sides on the 
competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China 
Sea, it urges claimants to pursue their territorial claims and accompanying 
rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN Convention on 
the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). As a signatory of UNCLOS, mainland 
China's reaction to international pressure, especially from the U.S., 
would have implications for its world image as a rising power that 
respects rule-based international order. 
In addition to the legal contentions, the reaction of regional actors 
(both states and regional org.anizations) to Hillary Clinton's remarks 
in the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Meeting on July 23, 
3. People's Republic of China, "Letter to Secretary-General of the United 
Nations," Doc. CML/17/2009, May 7, 2009; People's Republic of China, 
"Letter to Secretary-General of the. United Nations," Doc. CML/18/2009, 
May 7, 2009. 
4. The estimation has been mentioned by numerous authors, for instance, 
Sigfrido Burgos Caceres, China's Strategic Interests in the South China 
Sea: Power and Resources (London: Routledge 2013), p.112. Officially, 
however, mainland China reiterates that China is not claiming sovereignty 
over all the South China Sea. See Robert Beckman, "The China-Philippines 
Dispute in the South China Sea: Does Beijing Have Legitimate Claim?" 
<http:/ I cit.nus. edu. sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/ 12/Proffieckman-RSIS-
China-PhilippinesDisputeinSCS-7Mar2012.pdf>. 
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2010 added a new force in recent dynamics. In her remarks, Clinton 
reiterated that the U.S. has a national interest in freedom of navigation, 
open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international 
law in the South China Sea; supports a collaborative diplomatic process 
by all claimants for resolving territorial dispute without coercion; and 
opposes the use or threat of force by any claimant.5 Suggesting 
multilateral approaches to dispute settlement in the South China Sea 
appears to challenge mainland China's position on negotiating territorial 
disputes bilaterally with the parties directly involved. Thus, mainland 
China responded with military actions and diplomatic condemnation. 
Despite mainland China's loud protest, however, most ARF member 
states welcomed Clinton's remarks. 
Subsequent developments have thrust ASEAN into the limelight. 
First, military and diplomatic contests between the U.S. and mainland 
China over the South China Sea have become part of their respective 
overall strategies in the region. Such geo-strategic competition provides 
ASEAN member claimants with opportunities to engage with the U.S. 
and other U.S. allies in order to counterbalance Chinese assertiveness. 
Second, encouraged by the U.S. active participation in regional 
multilateral institutions, which is one of the pillars in Obama's 
rebalancing strategy,6 members of ASEAN and ASEAN-extended 
5. Hillary Clinton, "Remarks at Press Availability," U.S. Department of 
State, July 23, 20 I 0, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/ 
rm/2010/07 /145095.htm>. 
6. Hillary Clinton, "Remarks on Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles 
and Priorities," U.S. Department of State, January 12, 2010, <http://m. 
state.gov/mdl35090.htm>; Hillary Clinton, "America's Pacific Century," Foreign 
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regional mechanisms (such as ARF, ASEAN Defense Ministerial 
Meeting Plus, and East Asia Summit) have started to express their 
concerns about regional security ramifications and offer suggestions 
of tension management in the South China Sea. 
Another developing trend that has contributed to recent tension 
is the adoption of more aggressive tactics for exercising sovereign 
rights by all the claimants. In addition to traditional measures, such 
as military presence, visits of high ranking officials, and construction 
of small fixtures in the disputed areas, claimants increasingly have 
dispatched paramilitary patrol vessels to safeguard their interests in 
the disputed waters. Those paramilitary actions have been augmented 
by domestic legislation, law enforcement, and administrative measures. 
With national sentiments and economic interests at stake, the private 
sector (mainly fishermen and oil companies) is now also frequently 
involved in sea incidents. Claimants have increasingly resorted to 
unilateral measures to create "facts on the ground" and eschew 
diplomatic negotiations. Consequently, incidents at sea have increased. 
The situation has been exacerbated as mainland China began to 
more assertively enforce what Beijing perceives to be its maritime 
rights. Since mainland China reorganized its maritime administration 
in 2013, its capacity and determination for stricter law enforcement 
against unwelcome intrusion into territorial waters has been strengthened. 
When other claimants respond to mainland China's assertive moves 
by adopting reciprocal or retaliatory measures, the risk of maritime 
skirmishes and conflicts increase dramatically. The most recent incidents 
Policy, October 2011, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011110/11/ 
americas _pacific_ century>. 
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involved friction between Vietnam and mainland China over mainland 
China's building a deep-water oil rig in an area near the Paracel 
Islands. The dramatic standoff between Vietnamese and Chinese flotillas 
and the sinking of Vietnamese fishing boats by the PRC government 
vessels in May 2014 were followed by violent anti-Chinese demonstrations 
that turned into riots. Increases in the frequency and severity of 
incidents at sea call for collective responses to maritime insecurity. 
Although ASEAN countries individually have varying relationships 
with mainland China, they all share a common desire for regional 
stability. Therefore, developing a regional code of conduct to foster 
a norm-based order is taking on added importance as a collective goal 
for ASEAN. 
III. Institutional Responses 
What has ASEAN done in response to the new tense dynamics 
in the South China Sea? Although ASEAN has enjoyed (in fact, taken 
pride in) a long history of practicing the so-called "ASEAN way" of 
diplomacy in promoting regional peace and stability, it lacks experience 
in dispute settlement and conflict management. The designated function 
of the High Council in Treaty of Amity and Cooperation7 has never 
been utilized. Rather, informal diplomatic consultation seems to continue 
to be a commonly accepted approach to facilitate dispute resolution. 
When tensions in the South China Sea escalated in 2010, Vietnam 
was the ASEAN Chair. One of Vietnam's South China Sea policies 
was to internationalize the issues. Vietnam was able to leverage the 
7. The treaty was first signed by ASEAN members in 1976 and was amended 
in 1987 to open the document for accession by non-ASEAN states. 
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U.S. policy preference for addressing the South China Sea issues in 
multilateral forums and successfully place the South China Sea issues 
on the agenda of ASEAN and ASEAN-centered multilateral dialogue 
forums. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reaffirmed Hilary 
Clinton's remarks at ARF in the first ASEAN Defense Ministerial 
Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) held in Hanoi in October 2010,8 even 
when there was no pre-arranged agenda for discussing the South China 
Sea issue. Although ASEAN was undertaking negotiations on a regional 
code of conduct with mainland China, it also included UNCLOS in 
all the outcome documents of ASEAN and ASEAN-extended meetings 
to adhere to universally recognized principles of international law as 
the basis for ensuring peaceful resolutions to disputes in the area. 
When Indonesia took over the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2011, 
"ASEAN community in a global community of nations" became the 
major mandate in ASEAN meetings. To ensure ASEAN would be 
heard in the global community, ASEAN leaders reaffirmed the principles 
of ASEAN, on the basis of unity and solidarity, to coordinate and to 
endeavor to develop common positions in its dialogues with its dialogue 
partners. Naturally, Indonesia exerted its leadership to ensure ASEAN 
unity and collective commitment to promoting peace and stability in 
the South China Sea. 
In 2012, Indonesia passed its chairmanship to Cambodia, which 
enjoys close ties with mainland China. However, in the 45th ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting, Cambodia was not willing or able to uphold 
8. Robert Gates, "Remarks by at ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus," 
U.S. Department of Defense, October 12, 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/ 
transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcriptid=4 700>. 
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ASEAN unity in addressing the escalating tensions between ASEAN 
member claimants and mainland China. The meeting ended without 
issuing a joint statement for the first time in ASEAN's 45-year history. 
This outcome dealt a blow to the long-held desire for ASEAN solidarity. 
The situation was soon ameliorated after Indonesian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Marty Natalegawa conducted shuttle diplomacy to 
reach "ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea,"9 m 
which ministers reaffirmed commitment to the full implementation of 
the DOC, Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, early 
conclusion of a regional COC in the South China Sea, full respect 
for the universally recognized principles of UNCLOS, continued 
exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties, and 
peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the universally 
recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN CLOS. 
Later in November, ASEAN leaders and mainland China adopted the 
Joint Statement of the 1 Jlh A SEAN-China Summit on the 10th Anniversary 
of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
to commemorate the 101h anniversary of the agreement. 
The Philippines protested the way Cambodia had handled the 
South China Sea issue and hinted that the ASEAN route would not 
be the only route for the Philippines. In the 2012 ASEAN-Japan 
Summit, President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III stressed that as a 
sovereign state, "it is our right to defend our national interests." 
9. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Statement of ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers on ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea," 
July 20, 2012. Text can be found at <http://cogitasia.com/asean-foreign-
ministers-re I ease-statement-on-the-south-china-sea/>. 
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Reflecting its growing frustration with ASEAN's inability to forge a 
strong collective stance vis-a-vis mainland China, the Philippines, on 
January 22, 2013, without consulting ASEAN member states individually 
or collectively, 10 formally launched an arbitral tribunal under UN CLOS 
against mainland China. 11 Notification and Statement of Claim on the 
West Philippine Sea was sent to the PRC embassy in Manila. 12 The 
unilateral legal action of the Philippines raised concern among ASEAN 
member states. Nevertheless, the fear that a divided ASEAN might 
undermine the ongoing negotiation with mainland China was soon 
eased. Brunei took over the ASEAN chairmanship and continued 
ASEAN's engagements with mainland China on implementation of 
DOC. Both ASEAN and mainland China prefer that sovereignty disputes 
over features (islands and rocks) in the South China Sea can be settled 
JO. Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea," SAIS Review Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2013, p. 80. 
11. Secretary Albert del Rosario, "Statement: The Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China," released 
on January 22, 2013, <http://www.gov.ph/2013/01122/statement-the-
secretary-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-
china-january-22-2013/>. 
12. Department of Foreign Affairs, The Philippines, "Notification and Statement 
of Claim on the West Philippine Sea," January 22, 2013, <http://www. 
dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos>. In September 2012, 
Philippine President Aquino II signed Administrative Order No. 29, 
mandating that all government agencies use the name "West Philippine 
Sea" to refer to the parts of the South China Sea within the Philippinos' 
exclusive economic zone and tasked the National Mapping and Resource 
Information Authority (NAMRIA) to use the name in official maps to 
bolster the Philippines' claims to the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal. 
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directly by the claimants themselves. ASEAN could be a facilitator 
to promote mutual trust among the parties involved but has no intention 
to turn itself into a party to the dispute. Thus, the alternative to 
ASEAN channels taken by the Philippines to defend its own national 
interests seems to be acceptable. 
ASEAN and ASEAN-centered mechanisms have also called for 
responses to various maritime security concerns, such as marine en-
vironmental degradation, illegal fishing, piracy, terrorism, smuggling 
and trafficking, and other maritime transnational crimes. Concerted 
efforts of all state stakeholders are required to effectively address 
these issues. However, lack of trust due to disputes and military 
competition for control of the seas among great powers has inhibited 
the collaboration process. In the second ASEAN Maritime Forum, 
which was first launched in 2010 under the terms of the ASEAN 
Political Security Community Blueprint, participants agreed to expand 
their engagement with ASEAN dialogue partners in a separate meeting 
series. The First Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) included 
delegates from EAS member states at official and non-official levels 
and was launched on 5 October 2012 to explore possible region-wide 
collaboration on maritime security. In addition to general exchanges 
on maritime security concerns, the forum recognized the importance 
of universally-recognized principles of international law, specifically 
UNCLOS, in providing a rule-based framework for maritime security 
and cooperation in the region, as well as addressing the issue of 
competing claims. 
ASEAN and Recent Tensions in the South China Sea 14 7 
IV. DOC and COC 
The aforementioned institutional responses reflect ASEAN's 
collective diplomatic effort in addressing concerns over the South 
China Sea issues and ASEAN's capacity for engaging non-ASEAN 
powers in tension management. As a political document, the DOC 
signed in 2002 at least reflected the intent by the parties involved 
(namely ASEAN and mainland China) to develop confidence-building 
measures and enhance maritime cooperation to promote peace in the 
South China Sea. Areas of cooperation specified in the DOC included 
marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safe 
maritime navigation, search and rescue, and anti-transnational crime 
operations. The parties agreed that the task would be undertaken by 
senior officials of ASEAN member states and mainland China. In 
December 2004, the first ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting on 
DOC (SOM on the DOC) was held in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting 
concluded with the establishment of an ASEAN-China Joint Working 
Group on the Implementation of DOC (JWG on the DOC) to meet at 
least twice a year and report the progress to SOM. 
However, the process of implementing DOC did not begin smoothly. 
In the first JWG, which was held in Manila in August 2005, mainland 
China and ASEAN failed to reach an agreement on a draft of guidelines 
for the implementation of DOC suggested by ASEAN. Mainland China's 
main point of contention was the second point in the seven-point 
guidelines, which stated that ASEAN would continue its current practice 
of consulting amongst themselves before meeting mainland China. 
Mainland China argued that only those member claimants, not ASEAN 
itself, should be relevant to the South China Sea issues. The second 
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point could be perceived as an effort in making ASEAN's policy 
toward the South China Sea; thus, it would not be appropriate. Without 
reaching an agreement on the guidelines, JWG failed to function as intended. 
The second JWG was held in Sanya, China on February 8-9, 2006 
to specify areas of cooperation. After that, however, the third JWG 
was not held until March 2008. The 4th JWG on DOC was not held 
until April 2010, another two-year delay after the third meeting. The 
momentum resumed only after the U.S. started to adjust its strategic 
pivot to Asia under the Obama administration. The fifth JWG was 
held in Kunming, China in December 2010. Both ASEAN and mainland 
China reaffirmed the importance ofimplementing the DOC. Nevertheless, 
mainland China continued to resist three things: (I) internationalization 
of the disputes by inviting parties not directly concerned into discussion; 
(2) prior consultation among ASEAN member states before meeting 
mainland China; and (3) coordinated ASEAN policies or actions 
regarding disputes vis-a-vis mainland China. 
After ASEAN made concessions by dropping their prior consultations 
before meeting mainland China, ASEAN and mainland China agreed 
on the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC in the 44th 
ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Bali, Indonesia, in July 
2011. The second point of the original draft suggested by A SEAN in 
2005 was amended as "to promote dialogue and consultation among 
parties." This compromise implies that ASEAN could come to the 
negotiation table with ten different views. This allows mainland China 
to lobby individual states for their support and effectively weaken 
ASEAN unity. In the agreed guidelines, a new point was added, which 
required activities and projects carried out under the DOC to be 
reported to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting. This new point 
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upgraded JWG supervision from senior official level to the ministerial 
level. 
The long-term objective of the DOC, as stated in the document, 
is to set the stage for discussing and concluding a formal and binding 
Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). Despite 
the non-binding nature of the DOC, recognized rules or. principles of 
international law, such as the UN Charter, UNCLOS, TAC, and the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, were inked in the DOC to 
enhance its validity. Thus, a binding COC would take all of these 
elements into consideration. In the 5th JWG, a working group meeting 
on COC was held. Indonesia started to draft the COC in the 6th JWG 
in March 2011. Later, in the ASEAN-China Summit on November 18, 
2011, Wen Jiabao formally expressed mainland China's interest in drafting 
the COC with ASEAN member states. This rekindled the debate over 
whether ASEAN member states should first consult among themselves 
before meeting mainland China or invite mainland China to draft the 
COC together. A compromise was reached under which the ASEAN 
Chair would communicate with mainland China simultaneously while 
ASEAN member states discuss the draft. 
Although ASEAN Ministers failed to produce a joint statement 
after the 45th AMM in 2012, they reached an agreement on the 
"Proposed Elements of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea between ASEAN Member States and the People's Republic 
of China" in an earlier assembly session. In terms of dispute settlement, 
ASEAN members proposed such mechanisms as the ASEAN High 
Council (established under TAC) and those mechanisms under international 
law, including UNCLOS. In September 2012, Indonesia presented the 
Zero Draft, a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, to 
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Foreign Ministers of ASEAN member states on the sidelines of UNGA 
(United Nations General Assembly).13 This document relied heavily 
on DOC, ASEAN's Proposed Elements of a Regional COC, and 
ASEAN's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. 
Unfortunately, progress on COC negotiation did not proceed as 
ASEAN had hoped. Mainland China reiterated its insistence on the 
COC negotiation on different occasions. In the 19th ARF Foreign 
Ministers Meeting on July 11, 2012, Yang Jiechi emphasized that the 
COC discussions may be based on full compliance of the DOC by 
all parties. More confidence-building measures should be adopted to 
enhance mutual trust, promote cooperation and create necessary 
conditions for the formulation of COC. In the ASEAN High-Level 
Forum of the toth Anniversary of ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership 
on August 2, 2013, Wang Yi presented a view that negotiation of 
COC should proceed in a gradual manner to seek broad consensus 
and to maintain the comfort level of all parties involved because the 
negotiation would require sophisticated and complex coordination of 
multilateral interests of parties involved. More importantly, external 
interference should be avoided. 14 
The bottom line of mainland China's position toward the COC 
has been that it can only be consulted under the umbrella of the DOC. 
13. Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea", SAIS Review Vol. 33, No. 2, Summer-Fall 2013, p. 79. 
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, "Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi Attends China-ASEAN High-Level Forum" August 2, 
2013, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activi-
ties 663312/t1065124.shtml>. 
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The proper venue for it is the JWG on the DOC. Mainland China has 
no intention to negotiate the COC with ASEAN separately. Reportedly, 
healthy progress for the COC took place on September 14-15, 2013, 
in the back-to-back 6th SOM on DOC and the 9th JWG on DOC 
meetings in Suzhou, China. The participants agreed to follow the 
"step-by-step and reaching consensus through consultation" approach 
and to start from identifying the consensus to gradually expand the 
consensus and narrow the differences. Aside from continually and 
steadily pushing forward the COC process via the full and effective 
implementation of the DOC, the meeting also decided to authorize 
the JWG to conduct concrete consultations on the COC and agreed 
to take steps to establish an expert group. 15 
More concrete consultations on the COC took place on March 
18, 2014, in the 1 Oth JWG on DOC in Singapore. The meeting first 
reviewed the work plan on the Implementation of the DOC for 
2013-2014. Then, following the conclusion from the 6th SOM on DOC, 
the JWG meeting discussed those areas of convergence in order to 
come up with commonalities in developing the COC as well as a 
program for its work in 2014. The previous agreement on creating an 
expert group also witnessed further development; all parties had 
15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, "The Sixth 
Senior Officials Meeting and the Ninth Joint Working Group Meeting on 
the Implementation of the 'Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea' Are Held in Suzhou," September 15, 2013, <http://www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/mfa _ eng/zxxx _ 662805/tl 079289 .shtml >. "The Sixth Senior Officials 
Meeting and the Ninth Joint Working Group Meeting on the Implementation 
of the 'Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea' Are 
Held in Suzhou," September 15, 2013. 
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exchanged preliminary views on preparing Terms of Reference of the 
Eminent Persons and Experts Group (EPEG) or other mechanisms to 
support the official consultations. 
The most recent development of the COC was in the 7th ASEAN-
China SOM on DOC on April 21, 2014 in Pattaya, Thailand. In this 
meeting, participants agreed to continue building mutual trust and 
practical cooperation between ASEAN and mainland China in order 
to maintain and promote peace, stability, and maritime security in the 
South China Sea. With regard to the COC, while acknowledging the 
importance of building consensus and expanding commonalities in this 
respect, ASEAN reiterated the importance of expediting the ongoing 
COC consultation to further substantive discussions towards its early 
conclusion. Confirmed by the director-general of the ASEAN Affairs 
Department of Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more meetings 
will take place in order to accelerate the progress of the COC. 16 While 
progress seems slow, dialogue between ASEAN and mainland China 
on the South China Sea has moved the needle. 
V. Conclusion 
ASEAN member states might have different interests in the South 
China Sea, in particular with regard to how to respond to mainland 
China. However, all of them share common interest in pursuing stability 
and security in the region as well as maintaining the solidarity and 
centrality of ASEAN on key regional issues. ASEAN does not have 
16."No Timeframe for South China Sea Code of Conduct: Thai ASEAN 
Affairs Official," Xinhuanet, April 21, 2014, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
english/china/2014-04/21/c_l 33278243 .htm>. 
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sufficient institutional capacity to resolve sovereignty disputes over 
features in the South China Sea, but it has tried to facilitate peaceful 
resolution and prevent the use of force by any claimant. As tension 
has escalated, the South China Sea issues have been vigorously 
discussed in meetings of ASEAN and ASEAN-extended mechanisms 
despite mainland China's displeasure or opposition. 
The ASEAN Chair still matters for ASEAN to play a decisive 
role in dynamics of South China Sea security. One of the major reasons 
that ASEAN could successfully regain the South China Sea agenda 
was Vietnam's chairmanship in 2010 and Indonesia's in 2011, respectively. 
Both countries have important stakes and national interests in the 
South China Sea. Cambodia's chairmanship in 2012 apparently was a 
setback due to its close ties with mainland China. The momentum 
resumed when Cambodia passed its chairmanship to Brunei and when 
a career Vietnamese diplomat, Le Luong Minh, replaced Surin Pitsuwan 
as ASEAN Secretary-General in 2013. 
Although ASEAN unity was once challenged when no joint 
statement was produced in the 45th AMM and when the Philippines 
turned to the UN tribunal without prior consultation with ASEAN 
member states, the confidence of solidarity was soon restored. In 
response to mainland China's recent move of a drilling platform 
escorted by more than 80 armed paramilitary vessels in the disputed 
waters, the ASEAN foreign ministers issued a rare stand-alone statement 
in May 2014 expressing "serious concern" about growing tension over 
territorial claims. The statement suggests that member states share a 
higher degree of anxiety over the recent developments and that there 
is an enhanced commitment to maintaining ASEAN unity. 
ASEAN, as a regional organization, will not and cannot be a 
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party in the territorial disputes. It will remain neutral to any claim. 
While facilitating a peaceful resolution process for parties involved, 
ASEAN, with structural inferiority vis-a-vis mainland China, has also 
been cautious not to conflict with mainland China's position on solving 
territorial disputes bilaterally or to jeopardize its overall economic 
relationship with mainland China. Although ASEAN member states 
hold a common position on implementing the DOC and negotiating 
the COC, it is often reiterated that their collective efforts should not 
be seen as the group's policy to counter mainland China. From ASEAN's 
perspective, a unified ASEAN that upholds Southeast Asian autonomy 
in its relations with external powers and maintains its centrality in 
the region's political and security architecture would better serve the 
region's security interests. 
